Announcements

Asia Pacific Journal of Management (APJM)

Special Issue Call for Papers

State Capitalism and Entrepreneurs in an International Setting

Guest Editors

David Ahlstrom (Hong Kong Metropolitan University)

Gongming Qian (Shantou University)

Jiatao Li (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)

Bin Liu (Xiamen University)

Tentative Submission deadline: June 1, 2026

First author notification: October 1, 2026

Special issue workshop: January 15, 2027

Tentative publication date: December 2027

Click the link below to download the Call for Papers 

Special Issue Call for Papers 2025

Call for Papers: Special Issues on “Techno-Nationalism, State Strategy, and Corporate Innovation in the Asia-Pacific”

Guest Editors

Jiatao Li, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Di (David) Fan, RMIT University, Australia. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Wei Liu, Qingdao University, China. Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Siah Hwee Ang, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

The Rise of Techno-Nationalism

In today’s highly digitalized and knowledge-driven global economy, technology has come to signify far more than traditional notions of productivity and efficiency. Its strategic importance has risen to the level of a critical determinant of national competitiveness, institutional security, and social stability. Against this backdrop, the emergence of techno-nationalism represents a salient new trend. Rather than prioritizing efficiency logics, techno-nationalism adopts a national security logic, situating the development, control, and application of key technologies at the very core of geopolitical competition (Petricevic & Teece, 2019; Edler et al., 2023). Its immediate manifestations include the bloc formation of national innovation systems, restrictions on cross-border R&D collaboration, the fragmentation of global supply chains (Buckley, 2022), and intensified contests over technology standards within global governance frameworks (Capri, 2020). From the fierce contests in semiconductors and artificial intelligence (Luo & Van Assche, 2023), to the unfolding policy confrontations between China’s “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) initiative and the United States’ Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), state strategies now play a central role in shaping firms’ innovation activities (Li et al., 2024).

Contemporary techno-nationalism is no longer merely a developmental strategy; it is increasingly characterized by protective and restrictive measures. These include export controls (Starrs & Germann, 2021), investment screening (Li et al., 2024), data sovereignty provisions, and institutionalized technology blockades (Witt, 2019). The resulting environment is one of increasingly zero-sum competition, where firms must navigate not only market logics but also the multiple tensions of national strategies, geopolitical risks, and institutional conflicts (Luo, 2021). Within this context, MNEs face heightened challenges to legitimacy, which becomes critical for their survival and growth in host countries—particularly in environments marked by diplomatic frictions (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Yoon et al., 2025).

Challenges of Techno-nationalism for Firms and Innovation

This environment presents highly complex challenges for firms, extending from macro-level institutional structures to firm-level strategy and organizational innovation (Wu & Fan, 2025). Specifically:

(1) Vulnerability and Dependence. Firms’ dual dependence on core technologies, key components, and strategic markets exposes them to unprecedented vulnerability when national policies shift. In particular, outward R&D investment is especially fragile due to the risks of misappropriation of intangible assets, making it more vulnerable than other forms of FDI that primarily face the risk of expropriation of tangible assets (Albino-Pimentel et al., 2022). Firms must therefore dynamically assess both “technological dependence” and “market dependence,” and strike a balance among compliance, defensive responses, and offensive strategies—such as alliance restructuring, standard-setting, and regionalized configurations (Luo, 2021).

(2) Restructuring of Innovation Networks. With the fragmentation of open innovation and global value chains (Farrell & Newman, 2020), the collaborative foundations of multinational R&D teams and innovation alliances is undergoing significant transformation. The trust deficit and geopolitical uncertainties triggered by deglobalization have increasingly constrained what was once regarded as borderless technological exchange (Zhang et al., 2024). As a result, firms are shifting away from reliance on cross-border knowledge spillovers and instead building more localized, and in some cases closed, innovation networks.

(3) Organizational Resilience and Governance Structures. Techno-nationalism is not only an external threat but also compels internal governance mechanisms and organizational architectures to be reconfigured. Regional substitution of supply chains (Kano et al., 2020), dual headquarter arrangements across jurisdictions, localized approaches to data governance, and corporate restructuring through “mirror subsidiaries” (as in the case of ByteDance’s response to U.S. regulatory pressures) (Luo, 2021) all illustrate how firms are constructing new forms of organizational resilience to cope with institutional and regulatory fragmentation.

(4) Strategic Dilemmas and Corporate Responsibility. Firms are caught in dilemmas between the logics of markets and the logics of states. This not only challenges the traditional assumptions of international business that emphasize open resources and positive-sum competition (Luo, 2021), but also raises new questions about the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and geopolitical responsibility. Against this backdrop, some MNEs have even pursued counterintuitive strategies—such as committing additional high-value R&D positions in host countries where diplomatic relations are strained—as a proactive non-market strategy to secure legitimacy (Yoon et al., 2025; Stevens & Newenham-Kahindi, 2017).

The Asia-Pacific as the Epicenter of Techno-Nationalism

The Asia-Pacific region constitutes a central stage for understanding techno-nationalism. On the one hand, the technological rivalry between China and the United States serves as the primary catalyst of this trend, with its repercussions—through export controls, entity lists, and investment screening—profoundly shaping regional supply chains and innovation ecosystems (Luo, 2021; Li et al., 2024). On the other hand, many economies in the region (such as China, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore) possess strong traditions as developmental states (Samuels, 1994). Governments actively intervene in and guide national innovation systems through industrial policies, state-led initiatives, and the promotion of “national champion” enterprises. While restricting technology outflows, these governments simultaneously implement openness-oriented policies to attract R&D-intensive FDI, aiming to accelerate technological catch-up through job creation and knowledge spillovers. This creates an institutional environment for MNEs that is inherently paradoxical (Luo, 2021; Lee & Lim, 2001).

Therefore, investigating how techno-nationalism reshapes corporate innovation and strategy can not only fill the theoretical gap in existing IB research between macro-level politics and micro-level firm practices (Koveshnikov et al., 2025; Buckley & Lessard, 2005), but also provide new insights into the resilience-building and innovation pathways of Asia-Pacific firms in this new normal. We provide an indicative list of possible topics below:

National Strategy and Institutional Environment

• How do the techno-nationalism strategies of different Asia-Pacific economies (e.g., China, Japan, South Korea, and India) differ in terms of underlying logic, strategic intent, and policy instruments? How have these differences shaped MNEs’ location choices and investment patterns?
• What unique role do state-owned enterprises (SOEs) play in advancing national techno-nationalist agendas? In what ways do their innovation motivations and behaviors diverge from those of private firms?
• How does techno-nationalism affect talent mobility across the Asia-Pacific region? How do restrictive or incentivizing policies aimed at attracting and retaining global technological talent challenge MNEs’ global talent management?
• How have emblematic policies—such as China’s MIC2025 and the United States’ FIRRMA—specifically influenced Asia-Pacific firms’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and venture capital decisions, including target selection, deal completion rates, and valuation?

Corporate Innovation and Strategic Responses

• Under the pressure of technological decoupling, how are MNEs restructuring their global R&D networks and knowledge management systems?
• In response to techno-nationalism, are firms developing new organizational forms and governance structures—for instance, more resilient regionalized supply chains, localized innovation hubs, or complex business reconfigurations such as the ByteDance case?
• How do MNEs manage their intellectual property (IP) portfolios across different techno-nationalist blocs in order to mitigate risks of forced technology transfer or IP leakage?
• How do engineers and scientists in cross-national R&D teams experience and negotiate potential tensions between their professional identities and national identities?
• How do MNEs engage in collective action—through industry associations or corporate alliances—to influence or buffer the effects of techno-nationalist policies?
• Faced with heightened risks of decoupling, how do MNEs evaluate and manage the dual vulnerabilities stemming from technological dependence and market dependence? How do different vulnerability combinations (e.g., high technology dependence/low market dependence) lead to divergent strategic responses?
• How do firms from smaller or non-aligned Asia-Pacific economies navigate the pressures of competing techno-nationalist blocs to sustain their innovation capabilities? 

1. Proposing its timeline.

• PDW Proposal¹: 15 April 2026
• PDW Decision: 10-15 May 2026
• PDW in the 14th AAoM Main Conference2026²: 16-20 June 2026
• Open for submission: 15 Jul 2026
• Submission deadline³: 15 Aug 2026
• First round decisions: Nov 2026
• Second round decisions: Apr 2027
• Final decision: Jul-Aug 2027

Note: 1. The guest editors will organize a paper development workshop (PDW) focusing on developing the ideas and papers intended for submission. We plan to hold the PDW for this special issue during the 14th Asia Academy of Management Main Conference (AAoM), 2026. The details of the PDW will be announced in due time.

2. All interested contributors will have an opportunity to present their work (at any stage of development) for discussion. Participation in the PDW is not a guarantee of acceptance of the paper for the special issue; it is neither a requirement for consideration of papers for inclusion in the special issue. A proposal with no more than 10 pages (excluding Tables/Figures, and References) is required for attending the PDW. The deadline for submitting the PDW proposals is planned for 15th April 2022. Proposals can be submitted to one of four guest editors via email.
3. Full Paper Submissions will be reviewed according to APJM double-blind review process, and the Special Issue is likely to be published in 2027-28. Papers for this issue should be prepared as per the Journal's guidelines available at: 

<https://link.springer.com/journal/10490/submission-guidelines>

Authors should submit an electronic copy of their manuscript via the journal's online submission system via < https://www.editorialmanager.com/apjm/default.aspx> 

REFERENCES

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Buckley, P. J. (2022). Navigating three vectors of power: Global strategy in a world of intense competition, aggressive nation states, and antagonistic civil society. Global Strategy Journal, 12(3), 543-554.

Buckley, P. J., & Lessard, D. (2005). Regaining the edge for international business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 36(6), 595–599.

Capri, A. 2020. Techno-nationalism: The US–China tech innovation race. Hinrich Foundation. https://www.hinrichfoundation.com/research/wp/us-china-tech-innovation-race.

Edler, J., Blind, K., Kroll, H., & Schubert, T. (2023). Technology sovereignty as an emerging frame for innovation policy. Defining rationales, ends and means. Research Policy, 52(6), 104765.

Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2020). Chained to globalization. Foreign Affairs, 99(1), 70-80.

Jackson, G., & Deeg, R. (2008). Comparing capitalisms: Understanding institutional diversity and its implications for international business. Journal of International Business Studies, 39(4), 540-561.

Kano, L., Tsang, E. W., & Yeung, H. W. C. (2020). Global value chains: A review of the multi-disciplinary literature. Journal of international business studies, 51(4), 577-622.

Koveshnikov, A., Adhur Kutty, A., Tienari, J., & Vaara, E. (in press). Nationalism and Contemporary Organizations: An Integrative Theoretical Framework and Agenda for Future Research. Academy of Management Annals. https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2023.0221

Kostova, T., & Zaheer, S. (1999). Organizational legitimacy under conditions of complexity: The case of the multinational enterprise. Academy of Management Review, 24(1), 64-81.

Lee, J., & Lim, C. (2001). Technological regimes, catching-up and leapfrogging: Findings from the Korean industries. Research Policy, 30(3), 459-483.

Li, J., Shapiro, D. M., Ufimtseva, A., & Zhang, P. (2024). Techno-nationalism and cross-border acquisitions in an age of geopolitical rivalry. Journal of International Business Studies, 55(9), 1190-1203.

Luo, Y. (2021). Illusions of techno-nationalism. Journal of International Business Studies, 53(4), 781-799.

Luo, Y., & Van Assche, A. (2023). The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States CHIPS and Science Act. Journal of international business studies, 54(8), 1423-1440.

Petricevic, O., & Teece, D. J. (2019). The structural reshaping of globalization: Implications for strategic sectors, profiting from innovation, and the multinational enterprise. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(9), 1487-1512.

Samuels, R. J. 1994. Rich nation, strong army: National security and the technological transformation of Japan. Cornell University Press.

Starrs, S. K., & Germann, J. (2021). Responding to the China challenge in techno‐nationalism: Divergence between Germany and the United States. Development and Change, 52(5), 1122-1146.

Stevens, C. E., & Newenham‐Kahindi, A. (2017). Legitimacy spillovers and political risk: The case of FDI in the East African community. Global Strategy Journal, 7(1), 10-35.

Witt, M. A. (2019). De-globalization: Theories, predictions, and opportunities for international business research. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(7), 1053-1077.

Wu, S., & Fan, D. (2025). Internationalization and innovation: A multilevel meta‐analysis of national sentiments. Journal of Product Innovation Management, 42(1), 253-283.

Yoon, H. D., Sinani, E., Papanastassiou, M., & Economou, I. G. (2025). More jobs for our foes? Global R&D strategy in the age of techno-nationalism. Research Policy, 105196.

Zhang, M. M., Lu, Y., Zhu, J. C., & Zhang, K. (2024). Dealing with trust deficit and liabilities of foreignness in host countries: Chinese multinational enterprises in Australia. Management International Review, 64(1), 35-58.